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Abstract: In this paper we propose a methodological 
and technical approach to develop model compilers 
which provide formal proof of semantic preservation 
and complement model-level verification activities 
with formal analysis on the generated source code. 
Our paper also details which characteristic a 
programming language shall exhibit to be used as 
target of a model compiler. Finally, we evaluate the 
impact of using formal programming languages on 
the development and qualification of model 
compilers. 
Keywords: Code generation, formal methods, 
model-driven development. 
 
1. Introduction 
Model-driven development is a major innovation 
vector for the construction of high-integrity 
embedded systems. The paradigm has been 
successfully applied to several large projects in the 
last decade, showing the advantages of shifting from 
source-centric to model-centric processes. 
Regardless of success stories, model-based 
approaches have failed to completely replace source 
code in the application life cycle. Why? 
The first observation is that some model 
transformation chains have failed to provide clear 
added-value for the modeling process. These model 
translators treat the model just as a blueprint of the 
source code providing no meaningful abstraction 
gain. For example, several UML2 tools implement a 
one-to-one mapping between model and source 
code elements: modeling is thus just "graphical 
coding". In this case, there is no advantage in 
choosing a programming language exhibiting 
particular properties: the generated code is used 
simply as an intermediate representation between 
model and object code and no additional verification 
activities are performed on it. 
The second observation concerns the preservation 
of model-level properties at source-level. This has 
been done by providing empirical evidence that the 
code generator has been developed with care and 
has undergone adequate testing. By contrast, 
formally proving that properties are preserved from 
model to source increases confidence in the model 
translator and in verification activities performed 
directly on the model. 
The third observation is that going from model to 
object-code is done in two explicit steps: first the 
source is generated and then it is compiled to object 
code. In other terms, source code is an explicit 
artifact of the development process. This requires 
explicit configuration management of source code, 
even if it could be desirable to treat it like any other 
intermediate representation generated during the 
compilation process.   
In this paper we propose a methodological and 
technical approach to circumvent some of the 
limitations described above. In particular, we focus 
on end-to-end property preservation and cohesion of 
the whole model compilation chain. While we fully 
acknowledge the importance of promoting model-
based development as a mean for abstraction, we 
intend to address this specific topic on a separate 
work.   
The approach described in this paper focuses on 
finding a formal and executable intermediate 
representation for a model. Such intermediate 
representation is used (1) to demonstrate that model 
properties are preserved; (2) to complement 
verification activities for the target platform; and (3) 
to compile the model to object code. Within this 
paper, we intend to explain why this approach would 
be of benefit in the development of model compilers 
in the high-integrity domain, with particular attention 
for application certification and tool qualification in 
the context of the DO-178 standard [18]. 
 
2. Overview of Modelling Languages 
In this section we provide a brief overview of some 
important modeling languages for high-integrity 
embedded systems and evaluate whether their 
compilation chains suffer from the limitations 
described in the introduction.  
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2.1 UML2, SysML and MARTE 
UML2 [1] is a general purpose graphical modeling 
language for object-oriented systems. The language 
is particularly suited to describe structural properties 
of systems – like components structure, services and 
interactions, state machines and deployment. In 
particular UML2 provides a graphical representation 
of a program’s architecture (i.e. the packages or 
namespaces, the types or classes, and the program 
operations).  
This graphical representation is a blueprint where 
relationships among types and classes have been 
made clear. This representation is more human-
readable than its textual counterpart (“a picture is 
worth a thousand words”). When used in this fashion 
UML2 is often complemented with textual 
representation for operation implementation (here a 
short text is worth a thousand pictures). The one 
pragmatic drawback when switching between the 
graphical and textual paradigm is at the environment 
level: UML2 tools are usually better at handling 
diagrams than editing text. 
To increase the expressiveness of UML2 diagrams, 
it is possible to use an abstract action language: a 
high-level and platform-independent textual 
language to describe algorithmic behavior. The OMG 
is currently standardizing such a language. UML2 
also relies on OCL (Object Constraint Language) to 
express constraints such as methods pre/post 
conditions, type invariants, and assertions.  
UML2 has a well defined platform-independent 
semantics. The UML2 standard defines the intended 
static and dynamic semantics and deliberately gives 
no indication on how such semantics should be 
implemented. Presently, the limitation of UML2 is its 
uncontrolled and complex multiple-view modeling 
space. A system may be modeled in UML2 from 
different overlapping viewpoints or, in more common 
terms, diagrams. Unfortunately, the standard does 
not provide clear indications on how to guarantee 
consistency among views. To guarantee view 
consistency, one limits the views used to non-
overlapping ones. See [2] for a discussion on the 
UML2 diagrams needed to model a complete system 
while avoiding view overlap.  
Code generation strategies for UML2 usually treat 
the model as a blueprint of the code: model 
elements are mapped to source via a one-to-one 
mapping. From this perspective, the target 
programming language is not particularly important 
since no methodological added value comes from 
targeting a specific language. Property preservation 
at source-level is difficult to demonstrate as some of 
these languages are hard to analyze formally and 
because most programming languages have no 
direct way to map OCL constraints, making it difficult 
to prove that dynamic and static model-level 
constraints are respected in the translated sources. 
SysML [3] is a UML2-derived language used to 
describe industrial systems with particular emphasis 
on system-level components interaction and hybrid 
systems modeling. MARTE [4] describes the 
concurrent execution in both platform-independent 
and platform-specific terms. The platform-specific 
semantic elements of MARTE can be used for 
schedulability and other types of concurrent system 
analysis. This subset of MARTE integrates AADL [5] 
via the UML profiling mechanism. 
 
2.2 Simulink and Stateflow 
Simulink and Stateflow [6] are used to model control 
systems via block diagrams (for data flow) and 
hierarchical state machines (for state-based 
behaviour) with an emphasis on mathematical 
equations. Differently from UML2-based tools, 
Simulink and Stateflow raise abstraction to the level 
of control theory and thier model translators employ 
a more complex code generation strategy translating 
a set of equations into a list of sequential operations 
with causal and temporal dependencies. Simulink 
and Stateflow model translators, however, do not 
provide evidence of property preservation and elide 
differences in mathematical semantics between 
model-space and target hardware. 
 
3. Introducing Verifying Model Compilers 
To improve the state-of-the-art a verifying model 
compiler would: (1) provide formal evidence that 
model properties are preserved in the model-to-
source translation; (2) perform target-dependent 
verification activities which cannot be easily done at 
model level; and (3) wrap the whole translation chain 
in a single logical tool.  
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3.1 Property Preservation 
Modeling languages are particularly well suited for 
the formalization and verification of structural 
properties (safety properties of state machines, 
determinism of concurrent models, ...). A limitation of 
today’s model translation technologies is the lack of 
formal evidence when it comes to property 
preservation in the refinement process from model to 
sources. The core reason for such limitation lies with 
target programming languages which are executable 
but not formally analyzable. In practice, the target 
programming language cannot formalize the 
properties expressed at model-level: such properties 
are “lost in translation”. 
The approach chosen for verifying model compilers 
is to target formal programming languages which are 
both executable and analyzable. Such programming 
languages should be able to represent the properties 
formalized at model level and permit their proof at 
source-level.  Some of the properties we are 
interested in are: 
 Information and data flow contracts: how 
components share data and information. 
 State machine properties such as safety, 
completeness, and determinism. 
 Design-by-contract in the form of pre/post-
conditions, invariants, and assertions. 
 Determinism and analyzability of concurrent 
execution. 
In section 4 we will analyze several target languages 
(SPARK/Ada, ACSL/C, JML/Java, Spec#/C#) and 
evaluate them in terms of property preservation, 
soundness of proving technology, efficiency, and 
interfacing abilities with other languages. This last 
point is significant as some components of the final 
application may be handcrafted possibly because of 
reuse or outsourcing. 
 
3.2 Complementing Verification Activities 
Verifying model compilers complement model-level 
verification with formal proofs at source-level. In fact, 
several crucial characteristics of a complete system 
can be proved only at source-level. For example, 
consider platform-specific properties such as 
absence of overflow, array-out-of-bound, or stack 
overflow errors: proving such properties requires 
knowledge of the implementation semantics and 
may not be provable at model-level – even in the 
presence of fully expressive abstract action 
languages. This need for source-level analysis to 
verify target-specific properties requires targeting a 
programming language for which sound proof 
techniques exist. 
Errors detected at source-level should be either fed 
back into the model (e.g. an overflow may imply that 
a computation in the model diverges) or are due to 
errors in the model compiler implementation. 
Absence of run-time errors in the generated sources 
reinforces confidence in the model compiler. In both 
cases the modeler need not understand the 
intermediate language representation used for 
formal verification. In section 4 we evaluate possible 
target programming languages from this perspective. 
  
3.3 A Single Logical Tool 
From a technical perspective, current model 
translation techniques separate source code 
generation from traditional source-to-object 
compilation. This strategy forces the modeler to 
regard source code as an explicit product of the 
development process and thus subject to 
configuration management, verification and 
traceability. To remove these source-centric 
activities, model-to-object translation should be 
wrapped in a single logical tool. A verifying model 
compiler would hide intermediate source code 
generation and proofs from the modeler in the same 
way a conventional compiler hides semantic analysis 
and intermediate code generation from 
programmers. Furthermore, by wrapping the whole 
model compilation chain in a single logical tool, it is 
easier to cross-compile a model, execute it, and 
debug it on the target hardware (or simulator). This 
approach is orthogonal to model execution/debug 
via interpretation on an abstract (UML) virtual 
machine. 
As a final note, a verifying model compiler should 
generate appropriate hooks where foreign code may 
be interfaced to incorporate existing or sub-
contracted components. 
 
4. Evaluation of Possible Target Languages 
As stated in the previous section, the intermediate 
representation generated by a model compiler shall: 
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1. Be unambiguous. 
2. Guarantee that the model semantics is 
preserved in the transformation to ensure that 
verification activities performed at the model 
level apply also to the final executable program. 
3. Permit additional target-dependent static 
verification activities to be performed, such as: 
checking for absence of run-time errors, 
verifying conformance to design contracts 
(pre/post conditions, invariants, etc.), analyzing 
stack size requirements, and computing worst-
case execution time. 
Point 1 says that the static and run-time semantics of 
the target language shall be well defined. Point 2 
says that the chosen target programming language 
must be rich enough to represent most (if not all) 
semantic constructs of the input model, possibly 
including formally expressed properties. Point 3 says 
that verification tools for the chosen programming 
language must exist to complement the verification 
activities performed at the model level. 
Contrary to the common practice, the developer of 
the model compiler, and not the end users, should 
choose the target programming language of a model 
compiler. This choice has a great impact on the 
development of a sound model compiler and on the 
possibility of qualifying it with respect to appropriate 
industrial standards (ex. DO-178). We return to this 
specific point in section 5. 
Considering the input modeling language of interest 
(the UML-centric family and Simulink/Statflow) and 
due to the requirements above, our candidate target 
programming languages are: 
1. SPARK: SPARK [8] is a subset of Ada 
augmented with annotations to describe 
contracts for information/data flow and behavior 
(pre/post conditions, invariants). Contracts can 
be formally proved through automated tools. 
2. C and the ANSI C Specification Language 
(ACSL): ACSL is an annotation conceptually 
similar to SPARK annotations. Contracts can be 
formally proved via automated tools, for 
example in Frama-C [9]. 
3. Java and the Java Modeling Language (JML). 
JML [10] is an annotation language to specify 
the behavior of Java programs. It is used to 
improve both static and dynamic checks for 
Java programs. Contracts can be formally 
proved using the ESC/Java2 theorem prover 
[10]. 
4. Spec# [11], an extension to the C# 
programming language to describe and formally 
prove behavioral contracts of C# programs. 
The choice of the target programming language is 
strongly connected to the availability of a 
conventional compiler presenting the appropriate 
characteristics. In particular, the compiler shall: 
 Target the chosen hardware target. 
 Produce efficient object code. 
 Require minimal run-time libraries. The time or 
space overhead induced by the run-time 
support may cause a discrepancy between the 
results of analysis performed at the modeling or 
programming language level and empirical 
evidence. For example, consider a compiler 
targeting a virtual machine that includes a 
thread to perform garbage collection: this thread 
is present neither in the model nor in the 
intermediate source-level representation, 
complicating the timing analysis. 
 Guarantee some form of traceability between 
source code and object code: this requirement 
derives from international standards for high-
integrity embedded systems development such 
as DO-178B for commercial avionics.  
We cannot thus evaluate programming languages 
and their compilers separately, but we shall instead 
treat them a whole.  
The fitness of a programming language as target of 
a model compiler is evaluated based on three 
criteria: (i) the programming language coverage of 
the semantic needs for modeling language described 
above, (ii) the kinds of static verification supported at 
source code level and (iii) the availability of 
compilers for the domain of interest.  
SPARK supports the description and proof of 
data/information flow and behavioral contracts. 
Concurrency is supported with first-class language 
features and annotations to prove absence of 
deadlocks, race conditions and priority ceiling 
violations. It has a focus on proving absence of run-
time errors such as numeric overflow or out-of-bound 
array indexes. It has a limited support for object-
oriented semantics: polymorphism is outside the 
language semantics. The SPARK theorem prover is 
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sound. SPARK is compiled to object code using 
standard Ada compilers: conventional compilers with 
the properties described above are available and all 
Ada compilers generate equivalent object code 
starting from the same SPARK program. Since 
SPARK is based on Ada, its interfacing with other 
languages is pretty straightforward. 
C and ACSL present characteristics similar to 
SPARK, with the main difference being the lack of 
support for concurrency. The typing system for C is 
much less expressive than the SPARK one: the C 
and ACSL representation of a given semantics can 
be much more verbose than the corresponding 
SPARK one. For example, SPARK can directly 
express type properties such as the minimal and 
maximal value for an integer; while ACSL requires 
annotations (logic formulae) for each single variable 
or formal parameter. This difference is caused by the 
different roots of the two languages: SPARK derives 
from Ada, which has an expressive typing system; 
ACSL is based on C which is extremely poor (and 
platform-dependent) when describing types. Sound 
theorem provers for ACSL exist, such as Frama-C 
[9]. C and ACSL are compiled to object code using C 
compilers: conventional compilers with the properties 
described above exist. Interfacing C with other 
languages is straightforward. 
Java and JML support formal specification and proof 
of properties on object-oriented programs using 
polymorphism. ESC/Java2 is, by its own design, an 
unsound theorem prover. The language does not 
provide advanced support for numeric types and 
their analysis. The language can rely on the 
concurrency features described by the Real-Time 
Java and Safety Critical Java initiatives, which are 
conceptually similar to those present in SPARK; 
however, no specific JML annotations exist for such 
concurrency features. A Java implementation may 
include a virtual machine to execute, increasing the 
semantic distance between the input for analysis and 
the actual executable.  
Spec# supports formal specification and proof of 
properties for object-oriented programs using 
polymorphism. The language does not provide 
advanced support to describe and analyze numeric 
types, and it lacks concurrency features appropriate 
for the domain of interest. At the moment of writing, 
Spec# requires a compiler targeting a .NET 
implementation, making it unsuitable for high-
integrity embedded systems. 
Language Evaluation 
SPARK 
Expressivity: ++ 
Static verification: ++ 
Compilation: +++ 
C/ACSL (Frama-C) 
Expressivity: + 
Static verification: ++ 
Compilation: +++ 
Java/JML 
Expressivity: ++ 
Static verification: + 
Compilation: ++ 
Spec# 
Expressivity: ++ 
Static verification: ++ 
Compilation: + 
 
The summarized results of our evaluation are: 
 SPARK supports design-by-contract, numerics 
and concurrency but has a limited support for 
object orientation. It uses a sound theorem 
prover. It is compiled to efficient object code. 
 C and ACSL support design-by-contract, but 
have a limited supports for numerics and object-
orientation; they do not support concurrency. A 
sound theorem prover is available. It is 
compiled to efficient object code. 
 Java and JML support design-by-contract and 
object orientation. They do not support 
advanced numeric types or concurrency. Their 
theorem prover is unsound. The compilation 
process comes with a significant run-time 
system and does not lead to very efficient code. 
 Spec# supports design-by-contract and object 
orientation. It does not support advanced 
numeric types nor concurrency. Its theorem 
prover is sound.. At the time of writing, no 
compiler apt for the domain of interest exists. 
The result of our analysis does not identify a clear 
winner, even if SPARK and C/ACSL are probably the 
most suitable solutions for the domain of interest. 
The main limit of these languages is the lack of 
support for object-oriented features. 
 
4.1 Examples of a SPARK Verifying Model Compiler 
Usage 
In this section we provide some simple examples on 
how the verifying model compiler philosophy can be 
of benefit in the development of high-integrity 
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software. The first two examples target Stateflow 
and Simulink models, while the third and fourth focus 
on Executable UML models.  
The first example is taken from the February 2010 
issue of "Communication of the ACM" [12]. In [12] 
the authors use a separate formal specification 
language to model the behavior of a microwave oven 
and prove a set of properties on it via model 
checking. A typical property is: "if the oven is 
running, then the door is closed". The control 
algorithm of the microwave oven is modeled in 
Stateflow. The proof technology used in [12] is 
NuSMV [13]. To demonstrate that the property was 
not satisfied by the input model and to produce a 
counter example, the NuSMV theorem prover 
produced and evaluated 9.8x10
6
 states.  
The second example is taken from a Simulink model 
to implement the control algorithm for a window 
manager to be used in heads-up and heads-down 
displays for next-generation commercial aircraft [19]. 
Among the properties proved on the Simulink model, 
the most interesting are related to the logic of 
selecting the most appropriate unit to display the 
information to the user. The properties were again 
proved at model level by using model checking 
techniques. 
Our main goal was to evaluate if we could translate 
the model and properties of interest in SPARK so as 
to use a unique representation to feed to the proof 
engine and the traditional compiler. Following our 
verifying model compiler vision, we wanted to (i) 
decrease the semantic distance between the 
executable and its formal specification used to prove 
properties and (ii) increase the confidence that the 
source code representation implements the model 
semantics by proving that the properties proved at 
model level still hold at source level. It must be noted 
that the SPARK proving technology is based on 
abstract interpretation and deductive verification 
rather than model checking. 
We translated both the Stateflow model of [12] and 
the Simulink model of [19] in SPARK and added the 
properties of interest as post conditions of the 
subprogram implementing, respectively, the state 
machine logic and the control algorithm. For the 
Stateflow model, we were also able to fully model 
the state machine logic as a concatenation of logic 
expressions (again, as part of the post condition of 
the subprogram implementing the state machine 
logic). We used a prototype of the Simulink and 
Stateflow Ada back-end based on the Gene-Auto 
technology [15] and manually added SPARK 
annotations a posteriori on the generated code. The 
process of manually adding annotations was 
straightforward and we expect their automatic 
generation to be likewise. The SPARK code was 
translated into, respectively, 50 and 38 verification 
conditions. It is included in an extended version of 
this paper on the AdaCore web site [26]. We used a 
development version of the SPARK technology 
which can be coupled with the SMT solvers through 
the Victor translator [29]. 
The SPARK technology was able to prove the same 
properties and detect the same violations detected 
by the technology used in the original papers. 
SPARK was also able to provide precise conditions 
under which the violated properties do not hold. 
Such conditions are equivalent to the counter 
example produced by the NuSMV model checker. In 
addition, we were also able to prove that the 
properties of interest hold when the input model is 
slightly changed, again as suggested in the original 
papers. SPARK was of course able to prove also the 
absence of run-time errors, a task at which model 
checkers are usually not particularly effective. 
The last two examples we list focus on the proof of 
absence of run-time errors in the code generated 
from an Executable UML model. Such experiments 
were successfully carried out by AdaCore clients 
using model compilers targeting SPARK on 
commercial applications in the defense [16] and 
energy domains [17] using different Executable UML 
modeling environments (respectively Mentor 
Graphics BridgePoint and Kennedy Carter iUML). In 
the cited projects, the generation of SPARK from 
Executable UML models permitted a zero-cost 
formal verification of absence of run-time errors in 
the functionalities encoded using an abstract action 
language which manipulates Executable UML 
elements. In particular, no specific constraints were 
imposed on the modeling standard to accommodate 
the generation of SPARK code and all required 
annotations were automatically generated. We 
acknowledge that this approach defeats the use of 
SPARK as a design-by-contract tool: the contracts 
are inferred automatically from the implementation in 
Executable UML. However, the purpose for the use 
of SPARK in this context was the proof of absence of 
run-time errors, rather than partial correctness: from 
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this point of view, the SPARK model compilers were 
extremely successful in complementing model-level 
verification activities with source level formal 
verification without requiring any modification to the 
users' modeling practice. 
  
5. Developing Verifying Model Compilers 
In the previous section we provided evidence that 
the verifying model compiler vision is feasible and 
has already been applied in industrial projects. We 
now focus on the evaluation of the impact of using 
formal programming languages as target for the 
model compilation chain in terms of: 
 Development of the model compiler itself. 
 Qualification of the model compiler in a DO-178 
context. 
 Certification in a DO-178 context of an 
application including generated code. 
Our feedback derives from our involvement with the 
Gene-Auto consortium (ITEA 05018, [14]) for the 
development of a SPARK back-end for a sound 
subset of Simulink and StateFlow. 
 
5.1 Impact on Model Compiler Development 
While being constrained by SPARK semantic and 
syntactic limitations increased the initial definition of 
the code generation strategy, the use of a formal 
programming language as target for a model 
compiler caused surprising benefits during the 
development of the latter. The generated code 
produced by the prototype SPARK back-end for 
Gene-Auto had to be compilable and pass a small 
formal verification test. This requirement led to the 
discovery of several inconsistencies within the whole 
model compilation chain, including the part shared 
with the back-end for the C programming language. 
The errors we found included uninitialized or useless 
variables, dead code and unnecessary statements 
(for example, an if statement statically evaluable to 
False or True). Such discoveries permitted to greatly 
improve the Gene-Auto model compiler, with 
benefits for both the SPARK and C back-ends. In 
this particular case the same errors could have been 
caught by less formal verification tools (for example 
CodePeer [27] and Coverity Static Analysis [28]) 
which do not require the use of stringent semantics 
as for SPARK. However, the use of a formal 
language is still of benefit because it leaves the door 
open for more advanced formal analysis, in 
particular related to the absence of run-time errors 
and partial correctness (see the following sections).  
 
5.2 Impact on DO-178 Tool Qualification 
DO-178 does not discuss directly if/how the 
qualification of a model compiler could alleviate the 
verification activities on the generated code. An 
accepted approach in industrial practice (see for 
example [32]) is however to formalize low-level 
requirements in a model and rely on a model 
compiler qualified as development tool to:  
1. Perform some verification activities (for example 
testing and structural coverage) on the model, 
typically via simulation: verification at a higher 
abstraction level is expected to be less costly. 
2. Skip some verification activities on the source 
code (for example compliance with low-level 
requirements) because the generated code is 
expected to be faithful to its model-level 
specification. 
In order to rely on model simulation instead of testing 
of executable code for verification activities, it is also 
usually necessary to produce evidence that the 
generated code is compiled to object code 
preserving the same functional properties. The 
whole qualification process of a development tool is 
extremely costly: for Gene-Auto the estimated 
qualification cost is around eight person years. The 
high initial investment in qualifying a model compiler 
as a development tool has been so far a barrier to 
the commercial availability of qualified model 
compilers.  
In this paper, we propose an alternative path which 
could be considered to alleviate the qualification 
costs of a model compiler. Our approach does not 
consider for the moment how to provide evidence of 
property preservation from the generated source 
code to the (cross-)compiled object code. It is 
however worth noting that it is usually simpler to 
provide such evidence for formal programming 
languages because they employ a much simpler 
semantics and thus do not exercise particularly 
advanced or obscure features of a 
language/compiler. 
The strategy we propose here to alleviate the cost of 
qualifying a model compiler is conceptually similar to 
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the "Unit Proof" methodology promoted by Airbus 
[25], which permits to eliminate most verification 
activities on source code if (i) all low-level 
requirements are expressed as formal properties, (ii) 
the formal verification framework is qualified 
accordingly to DO-178 as a verification tool. In a DO-
178 context, qualifying a verification tool (like a 
theorem prover) is much less costly than qualifying a 
development tool (like a model compiler). The same 
applies also to Tool Qualification Levels in DO-178C. 
The strategy we propose requires to: 
1. Express low-level requirements at model-level, 
potentially using formal specification of 
properties. Formal specification of properties is 
not always necessary: for example, the logic of 
a state machine by itself formalizes low-level 
requirements without requiring the explicit 
production of formal properties. This point 
requires a modeling language able to model 
formal properties: this is the case of both 
Simulink/Stateflow and Executable UML (via 
OCL).  
2. Verify that all model-level properties are 
correctly translated to the formal programming 
language targeted by the model compiler. 
Additional properties may be produced in the 
source code, for example to represent the logic 
of a state machine as a post-condition (see also 
the source code available in the extended 
version of this paper [26]). 
3. Prove that all model level properties hold at 
source level. As show in section 4.1, we were 
able to formally express and prove model-level 
properties on SPARK programs. 
4. Qualify the formal verification technology used 
at point 3 as a verification tool. 
If the conditions above are all met, we can formally 
demonstrate that the generated source code 
complies with the low-level requirements formalized 
at model level, without qualifying the model compiler 
as a development tool. We thus believe that the 
verifying model compiler vision could permit to 
benefit of the advantages typical of a qualified model 
compiler (reduction of verification activities on source 
code) without actually requiring the qualification of 
the model compiler itself. 
5.3 Impact on DO-178 Application Certification 
The use of formal programming languages as a 
mean to decrease the cost of unit testing is 
increasing in the high-integrity domain: consider, in 
addition to SPARK, the use of tools like Caveat [20] 
and Astrée [21]. By targeting a formal programming 
language, we guarantee that the generated source 
code can be safely integrated with other (legacy) 
high-integrity components written in the same formal 
language. For example, the generation of SPARK 
assures that the same level of safety can be 
maintained across different software components 
and that global, application-level analysis can be 
performed. If we targeted classical programming 
languages, we would have limited the formal 
verification to a component-by-component basis and 
required manual analysis for the integration of 
manually written SPARK and generated Ada code. 
The model compiler vision fully guarantees that the 
proven advantages of using formal programming 
languages in a DO-178 certification context can be 
applied even when the application code is partially 
generated from modeling languages.  
 
6. Related work 
The use of intermediate (pivot) languages for formal 
verification has been already proposed and 
implemented in TOPCASED with Fiacre [22]. 
However, Fiacre is a verification-oriented pivot 
language: its use consists in being generated from 
modeling languages like AADL to verify some 
specific properties. The implementation of the source 
model into source code is then produced with a 
separate code generator which has neither visibility 
nor knowledge of Fiacre. Proof of semantic 
consistency between the generated source code and 
the formal model used for verification thus remains 
an open point. With verifying model compilers the 
verification and implementation-oriented views are 
consistent by construction because they collapse to 
the same representation. Such representation, for 
example a SPARK program, is indeed analyzable, 
executable and can be compiled to object code with 
mature technologies. 
Another interesting approach closer to the verifying 
model compiler vision is the one proposed by ClawZ 
[23]. It provides formal evidence of semantic 
preservation of the refinement process from Simulink 
models to SPARK source code. This evidence is 
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provided by translating both the Simulink model and 
SPARK program into Z schemas and formally 
proving their equivalence. To achieve this result, it 
was necessary to define a formal Z representation 
for a subset of Simulink; a Z representation for 
SPARK is, on the other side, already available [24]. 
The main advantage of ClawZ is its verification tool 
nature, meaning that its DO-178 qualification would 
cost less than qualifying a code generator (which is a 
development tool). In addition it does not need to 
have any internal knowledge of the code generator, 
as it just copes with the initial input (the model) and 
the final output (the SPARK code). The approach 
proposed by ClawZ is conceptually similar to the one 
we propose, in the sense they both require formal 
programming languages to be the target of code 
generation: it is not a coincidence that SPARK is the 
target language of ClawZ. At this stage, the main 
advantage of the model compiler vision is the 
avoidance of using additional explicit formal 
representations (like Z) to prove property 
preservation. Recent advancements [33] on this 
technology suggest that the Z representations can 
be hidden. 
Formal evidence of property preservation can also 
be obtained by construction if the model compiler 
itself is formally developed/verified. This is the 
approach applied for the CompCert [30] compiler 
and for the block sequencer in Gene-Auto. Both 
technologies were developed using Coq [31]. The 
main limitation of this approach is that the complexity 
and cost of the formal development may drastically 
limit the scope of the technology. CompCert for 
example has only PowerPC and ARM back-ends, 
has limited optimization features and contains 
several functionalities (for example I/O and parsing) 
which are not formally specified/verified. The Gene-
Auto block sequencer is specified with 4500 SLOC 
of Coq (including 130 theorems) [34] and represents 
just a single step in the model compilation chain. 
The last alternative solution is to consider just 
verification of absence of run-time errors on the 
generated code using tools like Polyspace or 
CodePeer. This approach clearly does not provide 
any evidence of property preservation. The same of 
course applies when trying to infer the faithfulness of 
the generated code to the model by simply 
comparing test results obtained via model simulation 
and execution of the generated code. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed the vision for 
verifying model compilers. Verifying model compilers 
promise improvements over the state-of-the-art in 
code generation by targeting a formal programming 
language which (i) can automatically provide 
evidence that property proved at model level still 
hold at source level and (ii) can complement model-
level verification activities with source-level formal 
verification of platform-specific properties. We 
supported our point-of-view with limited experiments 
for Simulink and Stateflow models and with 
industrial-scale applications for Executable UML 
models. All experiments used SPARK as a target 
language. 
In this paper we also evaluated different 
programming languages with respect to the 
requirement of being used as targets of a verifying 
model compiler. The SPARK and Frama-C 
frameworks emerged as the most effective choices. 
Finally, we discussed the impact of targeting formal 
programming languages from several points of view, 
in particular (i) development process of a model 
compiler, (ii) DO-178 tool qualification and (iii) DO-
178 application certification. The deployment of 
verifying model compilers brings benefit for all 
aspects above. 
From a conceptual standpoint, the most valuable 
outcome of our discussion is the positioning of 
traditional programming languages within a model-
centric development process. In contexts outside the 
high-integrity domain, source code may well be 
considered as a derived artifact with no interesting 
properties. On the contrary, if property preservation 
and platform-specific verification are significant 
concerns, the formal programming language plays a 
pivotal role within a model-based compilation chain, 
even though such intermediate representation may 
not be directly visible to the modeler. This requires 
finding a semantic mapping for the modeling 
language which lends itself to formal verification via 
automated theorem proving. Considering this aspect, 
it is important to note that the dominant needs when 
developing a (verifying) model compiler shall be 
those expressed by the developers of the model 
compiler rather than those of the final users. Given 
the cost of qualification/certification and that mature 
technologies exist to easily integrate modules written 
in different programming languages, there is no 
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reason to target a less-than-ideal formal 
programming language. 
Formal programming languages and proof 
technologies may of course need to be enhanced to 
extend the set of properties they can prove and to 
ensure that properties can be preserved from model 
to sources. If this technical development is 
accomplished, verifying model compilers will ease 
the adoption of the model-driven paradigm, increase 
the confidence in modeled application, and improve 
the overall development process. 
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